Is this Conflict Really Necessary? by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Published Scholarship The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
1959
Is this Conflict Really Necessary?
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_scholarship_pub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Published Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation





[Reprinted from the June, 1959, issue of the TEXAS 1AW REVIEW]
Is This Conflict Really Necessary?*
ROGER J. TRAYNORt
Conflict of laws is one of the most hazardous of subjects, and it is with
hesitation that I approach it. Each new conflicts case seems to present an
extraordinary problem which refuses to fit into the existing scheme of
the law. However, there is no problem so extraordinary as to defy think-
ing about the ordinariness underlying the extra. It may hearten you to
know that here and there judges have come to notice that conflict of laws,
far from huddling in esoteric passes, exists for anyone to see in many a
mundane situation that never even comes to court because no lawyers
happen to be about with seeing eyes. Moreover, it has for a long time
been eking out an existence of sorts in the courtrooms themselves, though
in only a few states has it begun to have recognizable features. Then why
did the plot get so thick when the mystery was so thin?
One explanation is that until recently most judges have failed in a
purported conflicts case to ask: Is there a true conflict here? Had they
begun with this question they would have been compelled to inquire
sooner how sound was the prevailing conflicts theory of vested rights
embodied in the Restatement. Meanwhile they would have hastened the
day of International Shoe Co. v. Washington' by focusing their attention
on the prevention of needless conflicts engendered by mechanical rules.
It would then have taken less than sixty-eight years to move from Pen-
noyer v. Neff2 to International Shoe." We might well remember that this
advance is on one front alone and be on guard against another such sixty-
eight-year lag, for the world seems destined to move still more swiftly
ahead of lagging law from 1959 to 2027 than it did from 1877 to 1945.
However tardy, International Shoe significantly released state courts
from the territorial power concept of jurisdiction, which generated con-
flicts. It shifted the emphasis to jurisdiction based on minimum contacts
* Address presented on Law Day, April 24, 1959, at the University of Texas School of
Law.
-j Associate Justice, The Supreme Court of California.
1 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
* 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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with the state, fair notice and opportunity to be heard. It thereby facili-
tated suit where the facts giving rise to the cause of action occurred, re-
gardless of defendant's absence or nonresidence. By thus insuring a ra-
tional basis of jurisdiction, it served to eliminate the choice-of-law
problems that necessarily arose when the plaintiff was compelled to
resort to the courts of the state in which he chanced to serve the defend-
ant. However conscientiously such courts have ordinarily sought to ap-
ply the substantive law of the state where the facts took place, they have
become embroiled in the chronic problems of characterization, and in
the illusory classification of statutes of limitation, statutes of fraud, and
rules governing burden of proof.
Meanwhile the plea of forum non conveniens has become a useful
complement to the International Shoe doctrine, since courts persist in
recognizing service within the forum state as a basis for personal juris-
diction even when that state has no contact with the cause of action. To-
gether they can do much to discourage forum-shopping and compel liti-
gation of transactions where they took place rather than where the de-
fendant is by chance served with process. It of course bears noting that
as yet the International Shoe doctrine, including its most recent applica-
tion in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,' has been applied only to
corporations by the United States Supreme Court, though its extension
to other defendants seems probable.
As a counterbalance, Hanson v. Denckla5 reaffirms the restriction of
Pennoyer v. Neff6 on the personal jurisdiction of courts in states that
have no minimal contacts with the defendant. Nevertheless there is a
net gain of jurisdiction available to states in the modern concept of due
process that envisages not only minimum contacts as a primary basis
of jurisdiction but also fair notice and opportunity to be heard as the
primary tests for valid service. Most states have not yet begun to exer-
cise this jurisdiction. In part the fault lies with statutes that have not kept
pace. Even antiquated statutes, however, may be so geared to the due
process clause of the United States Constitution as to lend themselves to
interpretation in accord with the mutations in that clause. One might
note by way of illustration how the California courts have interpreted an
1872 statute authorizing service of process on foreign corporations doing
business in the state.7 They have reasoned that doing business was adopt-
' 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
* 357 U.S. 235 (1958) . See Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Courts To
Render Judgments Against Foreign Corporations and Nonresident individuals, 31 U.
So. Cau. L. REv. 339 (1958) ; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause
and The in Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1958) .
695 U.S. 714 (1877).
' Borgward v. Superior Court, 330 P.2d 789 (Cal. 1958); Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d855, 323 P.2d437 (1958).
658 [Vox.. 37
IS THIS CONFLICT REALLY NECESSARY?
ed as a test not for immunity but for jurisdiction, consonant with the
then tenor of the due process clause. Any test of jurisdiction geared to
its then tenor and expressed in pliant language was therefore no more
than illustrative of service of process in accord with the jurisdictional
concepts of that period. As those concepts became more flexible the courts
found that the wording of the 1872 statute yielded a correspondingly
flexible meaning. Thus in the given case it covered the local activity of
the corporation because that activity gave rise to the cause of action. It
is worth noting that "doing business" would probably call for greater
local activity if the cause of action were not local.
When statutes lack such flexible language, however, only the legisla-
tures can bring them up to date. The Illinois legislature set an example"
by enabling the state to take full advantage of permissible personal juris-
diction through service of process outside the state, provided the cause of
action arose in Illinois from the transaction of any business, the com-
mission of a tortious act, the ownership, use or possession of any real
property or the contracting to insure any person, property, or risk within
the state whether the policy was delivered by mail or otherwise.
If other states follow the example of Illinois, they should avoid such
pitfall phrases as "tortious act" which raised the problem in Nelson v.
Miller9 of whether the court would be precluded from taking jurisdiction
until the plaintiff had established that defendant's act was a tort. Not
all courts might resolve the problem as the Illinois Court did by con-
struing the statute as not requiring a determination of the merits as a
basis for determining jurisdiction. Drafters of statutes can probably
avoid the problem by avoiding such words as "tortious." Unless they
take such care a defendant might take a default judgment and resist sub-
sequent enforcement in his own state by collateral attack for lack of
jurisdiction, thus compelling plaintiff to litigate the merits there.
Even given a model law, state boundaries are still significant and Pen-
noyer v. Neff 10 will continue to restrain the personal jurisdiction of
courts. Suppose, for example, a nonresident defendant denied the owner-
ship, use, or possession of the local real property giving rise to the cause
of action, and that he had ever done anything in or out of the state in
any way connected with the property. Suppose, specifically, that he
denied ownership of a building that collapsed and injured the plaintiff.
A court able to reach out for the nonresident owner of a local building
could hardly reach out to impose ownership on a nonresident who de-
nied it. It is one thing to take a nonresident owner's local property or
* Iu.. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1957).
* 111Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). See also Order XI, Rule I~ee) of the Suprene
Court of England; BURNAND, ANNuAL PRAcrICE (1958); CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTE3*
NATIONAL LAw 117-19, 280-83 (5th ed. 1957).
1o 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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impose liability upon him for injuries caused thereby. It is quite another
to foist upon a nonresident the obligations of ownership.
If a state is not free to confer on an unwilling nonresident the status
of an owner, a fortiori it is not free to confer upon him a status attended
by even heavier obligations, such as fatherhood, as a recent California
case made clear."" The pertinent statute cryptically stated that "An ac-
tion may be brought for the purpose of having declared the existence or
nonexistence between the parties of the relation of parent and child, by
birth or adoption." Plaintiff, domiciled in California, brought an action
under the statute against a nonresident defendant based on service out-
side the state. He sought to justify such service as in accord with local
code provisions on the ground that the proceeding to establish paternity
was a proceeding in rem by analogy to ex parte divorce proceedings. He
contended that, as with marital status, the state of his domicile had
sufficient interest in his status as defendant's child to adjudicate that
status without securing personal jurisdiction over the defendant The
court first declared that even though the proceeding dealt with status it
was not necessarily in rem. It went on to distinguish the ex parte divorce
cases, noting that a state court's termination of a marital relationship to
which a domiciliary is a party is a far cry from creating that relation-
ship and making a nonresident an involuntary party thereto. An absent
defendant's regret at the termination of his marriage would hardly equal
his outrage at being made party to a marriage by some foreign court.
Yet the termination-creation dichotomy would not invariably serve to
test jurisdiction. Thus an absent defendant might be equally outraged at
the termination or creation of a parent-child relationship by a foreign
court.
We are driven to question the reality of traditional jargon about in rem
and in personam jurisdiction in these aggravated clinical cases where we
deal with the fictional res of status. What could be more personal than
the intimate marital or parental relationship? Whatever the historical
explanation of their reification as a means of circumventing Pennoyer v.
Neff' 2 while purporting to respect it, the time has come to slough off the
ritualistic classifications through which judges still feel bound to think
their hard way to realistic decisions.
Why should they not be free to consider jurisdiction at the outset in
the complex of the parties' contacts with the forum state, the interests
of the state concerned in in the outcome, and a prevading concept of
fair play to all parties? The ex parte divorce cases might well have been
decided openly on these considerations when a plaintiff asked no more
"L Hartford v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956); see Horowitz, supra
note 5, at 369-77.
2 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
660 [Vox..t 37
IS THIS CONFLICT REALLY NECESSARY?
than freedom to remarry and there remained to the nonresident de-
fendant no more than a marriage in name. In this exceptional situation
a court could reason that even a defendant who had no contacts whatever
with the forum state would not be gravely affected by a decree enabling
the plaintiff to remarry, since there would be no way of compelling the
plaintiff to cohabit with defendant and no effective way of preventing
the plaintiff from cohabiting with anyone else. Moreover, divorce pro-
ceedings are not for the most part adversary except in name. In any
event, a defendant's purposeless interest in barricading the plaintiff's
avenue to freedom is overwhelmingly outweighed by the plaintiff's pur-
poseful interest in securing freedom. Finally, the dubious interest of
defendant's state in perpetuating a broken marriage in limbo is over-
whelmingly outweighed by the forum state's major interest in the or-
derly resolution of a plaintiff domiciliary's marital status.
State courts, however, are not free to take the initiative in abandon-
ing consideration of ex parte divorces in terms of a fictional res. So long
as they are thus constrained they must discourse in the jargon of in rem
jurisdiction, albeit with dismay that realistic analysis is thus obscured.
The constraint seems destined to continue. The Supreme Court's insis-
tence in the 1958 case of Hanson v. Denckla" that defendant must have
some contact with the forum state compels resort to a fictional res when
contact cannot otherwise be established.
The interacting considerations of the parties' contacts with the forum
state, the interests of the states concerned in the outcome and a per-
vading concept of fair play to both parties could have served equally well
to preclude jurisdiction when a plaintiff sought to terminate his duty
of support to his nonresident spouse, or alternatively when a plaintiff
sought support from the nonresident spouse.1 All three considerations
would militate against jurisdiction with such drastic consequences to the
nonresident defendant.
There is an element of contract and some equality of parties in the
marital relationship. These are lacking in the parent-child relationship,
and the interest of the state therefore becomes correspondingly larger in
any action involving parent and child. Contracts of both parties with the
state also take on larger and perhaps paramount importance, since the
consequences of any action either declaring or terminating the relation-
ship are so momentous to the parties. In conjunction with fair play,
these considerations would normally preclude jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant having no contact with the forum state. Nevertheless,
1a8357U.S. 235 (1958).
14 See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal.2d 389,
317 P.2d 987 (1957); Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); cf.
Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal.2d 516,254 P.2d 528 (1953).
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even here we must recognize that the state where a child is present must
be competent to regulate his custody whether his parent is present or
not 15 and if the parent cannot be found or has failed to discharge his
parental obligations, that state, given the best notice reasonably possible,
should be free to promote the interest of the child by permitting his
adoption.
Though a liberalized due process clause now makes available to state
courts an enlarged jurisdiction over nonresidents with the appropriate
minimum contacts, state statutes that prattle of "in rem" or impose
dated tests continue to plague the courts. Thus, in a 1957 California
case,1 6 the court felt compelled to find a quasi-m-rem basis for jurisdic-
tion, even though there were enough contacts with the state to justify
full in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, because a
statute authorized a personal judgment only if the defendant was a resi-
dent at the time of suit. Plaintiffs, members of the American Federation
of Musicians, sought a declaration that a collective bargaining agree-
ment providing for employer payments to a New York trustee was in-
valid. Plaintiffs contended that the payments represented wages wrong-
fully diverted to the trustee. There was personal jurisdiction over the
employers and the union but the statute precluded it over the trustee.
Could there then be jurisdiction quasi-in-rem to determine the interests
of the plaintiffs and trustee in the intangibles in question? Was the chose
in action, the payments admittedly due from the employers to the plain-
tiffs or the trustee, "property in the state" under a statute governing
actions relating to local real or personal property in which a nonresident
defendant claims an interest?
The statute was construed to give the court the full jurisdiction con-
sonant with due process. Plaintiffs had asked for a declaratory judgment
that would have the effect of terminating the trustee's interest in the
trust res. We noted that in actions involving intangibles a court could
take jurisdiction for some purposes without personal jurisdiction over all
the parties. It seemed as irrational to resolve the problem by assigning
a fictional situs to intangibles as it would to pin a tail blindfolded to a
nonexistent donkey. Instead it was identified as a problem of jurisdic-
tion over persons and property. It was resolved in terms of the interacting
elements of the parties' contacts with the forum state, the interests of the
states concerned in the outcome, and the pervading concept of fair play
to all parties. All of the parties had substantial contacts with California,
the forum state. Plaintiffs were residents of California. The payments
1s See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); cf. May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
16 Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 569 (1958).
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in question allegedly represented their wages for work in California. The
major elements of the transaction were in California; the trustee had
brought himself into this essentially local transaction by accepting the
trust; and under conventional choice of law rules, California law would
govern the question whether plaintiffs' compensation could be diverted
to the trustee.
California afforded an eminently convenient forum. Fairness to plain-
tiffs demanded that they be able to reach the fruits of their labors before
they were removed from the state. The union defendant and the em-
ployer defendants were within the personal jurisdiction of the court.
Fairness to them demanded a final adjudication of the conflicting claims
of the plaintiffs and the trustee. Had we held that the trustee's absence
precluded a declaratory judgment that would have the effect of termi-
nating his interest, plaintiffs could still have asserted that the employers'
payment to the trustee would not discharge the employers' obligation to
them, and that the federation would likewise be independently liable
for damages for breach of its fiduciary duty. The employers would then
have been subject to multiple actions, one by the plaintiffs and the other
by the trustee, with the attendant risk of double liability.
The case graphically illustrates how local statutes can limit the juris-
diction of courts available under the due process clause. The statute pre-
cluding a personal judgment unless the defendant was a resident at the
time of suit ruled out the possibility of a judgment against the trustee
that would hold him liable for an alleged breach of trust or compel him to
make an accounting. At most the court could determine only his interest
in the trust res under another statute authorizing the determination of
a nonresident's interest in property in the state. Clearly the Legislature
did not regard a judgment under this statute as a personal judgment such
as was precluded by the other statute. Yet it would affect the rights of
persons as any judgment does, and the jurisdictional question is not
solved simply by regarding the proceeding as in rem. The case made clear
that realistic tests to determine jurisdiction to grant the specific relief
sought must be applied regardless of labels. Justice is ill-served by me-
chanical ones.
It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions between in rem
and in personam, high time now in a mobile society where property in-
creasingly becomes intangible and the fictional res becomes stranger and
stranger. Insofar as courts remain given to asking "Res, res-who's got
the res?," they cripple their evaluation of the real factors that should de-
termine jurisdiction. They cannot evaluate the real factors squarely
until they give up the ghost of the res. As they do so, the gap will nar-
row between the tests of jurisdiction and the tests of forum non con-
veniens. With these converging, we can expect them to absorb choice-
1959]1 663
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of-law tests. This is eminently sound, for the state whose law controls is
the one whose courts are best qualified to interpret and apply it. There
would be no better way of decreasing choice-of-law problems and hence
conflict than thus to channel the litigation of transactions to that state.
Conflicts in certain areas are also bound to be minimized as we make
progress with model and uniform laws. Indeed, conflict might by now
have become uncontrollable had it not been for the pioneer uniform laws.
Imagine how disunited life would have been in the United States had
each state gone its ruggedly individual way on negotiable instruments,
bills of lading, warehouse receipts, stock transfers. Imagine how nego-
tiable instruments, those so-called couriers without luggage, would have
been slowed down if some states had demanded heartier endorsements
than others. Imagine a holder trying to hold on to his due course when
varying state rules set the course in all directions. Imagine the village
curlicues that would have appeared on bills of lading and warehouse
receipts. Imagine the bewilderment of shareholders trying to keep stock
of their titles without benefit of uniform rules.
Lest we grow complacent because we now have some uniform laws,
we might now and again call the roll of problems that still cry for uni-
form solution. True, we have a National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State laws. In all too large part, however, its proposals lie
idle. The grass that grows over them bears witness to our professional
apathy, for they might go far to clarify the law in many areas that need-
lessly breed conflict. We need town criers in every hamlet to arouse in-
terest in model acts that would enable us to will our worldly goods in
accord with local rules with some assurance that the same rules would
govern if at death we had another domicile or our goods another situs. It
is unfortunate that they so often do not, in an age when life and death in
an ancestral home on Blackacre is the exception rather than the rule, and
when a decedent so frequently leaves property in different forms at dif-
ferent places. The need grows daily for widespread study and action on
the Model Execution of Wills Act and the Uniform Probate of Foreign
Wills Act. There should also be study and action as to proposals that
would facilitate the administration of decedents' estates and rid it of
needless expense."7
The large question is how one enlists interest and moves from there to
study and action. Only occasionally does a judge have the luxury of ex-
pounding on the law that might be instead of the law that is. Lawyers,
engaged in the practice of the law that is, are hard put to it to do more
than enlist interest in law revision through their bar associations. We
" Such proposals would include the Uniform Acts on Powers of Foreign Representa-
tives, the Ancillary Administration of Estates, The Intestate Arbitration of Death,
Taxes, and the Interstate Compromise of Death Taxes.
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tend to think that legislators can readily enact model laws. They are so
heavily engaged in investigation and lawmaking on so many fronts,
however, that we cannot expect them to close ranks for the single-
minded task of making repairs and renewals in the common law. What
they can do, with the active cooperation of the bar, is to set up law
revision commissions such as are now at work in such states as New
York, New Jersey, and California. Such commissions, secure enough to
withstand the prevailing winds of pressure groups, can make the maxi-
mum use of the abundant wasting assets of scholarly studies. The day
is fast coming when no state can afford to be without such a commission.
Meanwhile the courts could do much more than they have done
toward a rapprochement of states in the optimum development of com-
mon law. The more courts strive for the optimum, the more they will
liquidate local anachronisms that breed conflict. The more they realize
that judicial law-making is something more than parroting the once
timely wisdom of their predecessors or perpetuating their sometimes
unfortunate foolishness, the more they will come to share at least the
idiom of their own day and therefore common rules. If I speak confi-
dently and not hypothetically of such a prospect, it is because of a belief
that law schools are training future lawyers and judges who will be
ready, willing, and able to analyze universal problems in a universal
language that transcends archaic modes of thought and the patois of their
own provinces.
Whatever studied efforts accomplish, there will be other forces at work
to diminish conflicts. Thus, when Congress preempts a field, as it did
with the Federal Employers' Liability Act, it cuts down conflict therein.18
Likewise, it cuts conflict down when it legislates interstitially on such
matters as interstate free railroad passes. Not all federal legislation, how-
ever, majestically preempts a field or modestly fills a chink. Often Con-
gress makes a camel-like entry into a field that compels the states to move
over, but not to move right out. The resulting uneasy joint tenancy, with
state law's dubious right to survive, does not always cut down conflict,
and sometimes breeds it anew. How far is the old tenants' authority cut?
How far does the new tenant choose to control? As yet we have only
sporadic answers to these questions.
The federal government itself, in countless new contacts with persons,
is nouveau riche with authority and seems sometimes uncertain in which
way to use it. There are sometimes no clues in the federal statutes, let
alone a directive specifying the substantive rules, or a directive such as
the one in the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 9 specifying as the applicable
law "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." The Su-
18 See EHRENZWBIG, CONFLICT Op IAws 28 (1958).
1o28 U.S.C.S 2680 (k) (1952).
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preme Court must then take its long views of the lay of the land, always
mindful of federal union, in declaring whether federal or state law or
both are applicable in a given relation between the federal government
and persons. 20 Enough cases are now emerging to suggest an evolution
of at least two complementary tests. Cases seriously involving the very
structure of a federally created institution, such as a national bank21 or
the very functioning of a federal program such as National Service Life
Insurance,22 call for a universal rule. Cases without such repercussions,
predominantly involving relations among persons, may call for appro-
priate state rules. Thus state law controlled the question whether an
illegitimate child came within the meaning of "children" in the copy-
right act providing for their succession to the right of copyright re-
newal." Obviously the case did not seriously involve the functioning of
federal copyright; it involved the parent-child relationship that has tra-
ditionally been a state concern.
Whether the Supreme Court, in relation to federal statutes without
specific directives, formulates a federal substantive rule or invokes an
appropriate state rule, it makes federal common law. When the appro-
priate state rule represents a choice among conflicting ones, the court also
makes a choice-of-law rule that is henceforth binding upon the states. In
this development of federal conunon law, it is free of the rule in Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins25 as extended by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,"26
which compels federal courts to apply not only local statutes but also
state decisional law, including choice-of-law rules. That rule is limited
to cases that involve diversity of citizenship and lack a controlling federal
question. Its underlying theory is that the constitutional grant of juris-
diction to federal courts in such diversity cases, unlike the grant of juris-
diction in admiralty cases, carries no grant of power beyond the passive
application of state law. There is no such restriction of their power, how-
ever, on federal questions. There can hence be no restriction in this field,
such as there is under the Klaxon case, on their power to make federal
choice-of-law rules.27 They can make them in the open field unhampered
by the host of irrational and inconsistent precedents that wander round
the inviting shady premises of the Restatement.
2 0 See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLMm. L. REV. 489
(1954) ; Mishikin, The Variousness of " Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in The
Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957) .
21 Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
22 See Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); cf. In re Allie's Estate, 50 Cal.2d
794, 329 P.2d 903 (1958).
23 See Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
24 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
25 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26313 U.S. 487 (1941).
2? See Mishkin, supra note 20.
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Given this power of federal courts, there is a corresponding disposses-
sion of state courts and hence a diminution of conflicts. Moreover, if the
federal courts develop an exemplary federal common law of conflicts,
their rules are bound to find their way into state law on similar problems
and thus to diminish conflicts further.
Exemplary federal rules, however, could hardly have more than this
limited effect. There would remain undisturbed the coral reEfs of state
law on conflicts involving no federal question. It behooves us then to
inquire into the possibilities of diminution of conflict through exemplary
state rules. They have been so far from exemplary in the past as to defy
rational and consistent development. Yet it became clear a generation
ago that a deep fault lay in the underlying theory of a superlaw set forth
as gospel in the Restatement, with an attendant catechism of questions
and answers.
Cook and Lorenzen and other scholars such as Currie, Ehrenzweig,
Cavers, and Stumberg, have demonstrated that superlaw is the most
impractical law on earth. There is compelling logic in the corollary that
within constitutional limitations local law is supreme. Judges must then
painstakingly evolve pragmatic exceptions to the local law that will
coalesce into a realistic law of conflicts. However hard their task is as
they work their way out of the wreckage of meretricious theories, they
can at least evaluate competing policies free of the misconceptions which
led to mechanical decision. Given a focus properly on local law and
vision presumably free of parochialism, judges can appraise the appro-
priateness of local law for the case in comparison with any plausible
exceptions.
In a series of articles that brilliantly set forth an affirmative new ap-
proach to conflict of laws, Professor Brainerd Currie28 has demonstrated
that often there is no real conflict and therefore no real basis for advanc-
ing an exception to the local law. He first sets apart the obvious case
wherein a court refers to foreign law, not for the rule of decision, but for
a datum point. Thus under a statute conferring benefits on widows, a
court may refer to the law of another state to verify a disputed contention
that a claimant has been married under that law. With that question re-
solved, the court can then determine the applicability of the local statute.
When it seems that the law of another state might also afford the rule
of decision, Professor Currie would have the court look first to see if there
28 Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation In The Conflict of Laws, 10
STrN. L. Rzy. 205 (1958) ; Married Women's Contracts: A Studr In Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958) ; On the Displacement Of The Law of The
Forum, 58 CoLUM. L. REy. 964 (1958) ; The Constitution And The Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests And The Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1958);
Notes on Methods and Objectives In The Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171. See also
Freund, Chief Justice Stone And The Conflict of Laws, 59 TLav. L. REv. 1210 (1946).
1959]1 667
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
is a local policy. If there is, the court would then look to see if there are
enough local contacts with the case to give the forum state an interest in
applying that policy. It would go through the same analysis as to the
policy, contacts, and interest of the other state. The court would not
yield to the interest of the other state except when there is no local policy
or no local contacts sufficient to give the forum state an interest in the
application of local policy. Professor Currie thereby succeeds in breaking
away from the fuzzy interchange of policy, contacts, and interest that
has characterized our awkward efforts to abandon the lexicon of super-
law. He clarifies the meaning of all three by putting first things first.
Such clarification is heartening to judges reluctant to resolve problems
in terms of the old lexicon, yet reluctant also to improvise at close range
to an isolated case that has come up at random in a crowded calendar of
unrelated ones. It seems clear that with such experimental pitons at
hand, a judge stands a far greater chance than before to reach at least a
ledge from which he can not only prepare for further exploration but
secure a rope to others.
Suppose now we test the proposition that, in the main, courts should
apply the law of the forum except when there is no local policy or no
local contacts sufficient to give the forum state an interest in the appli-
cation of local policy.
Certainly there should no longer be any question of the appropriate-
ness of local law if a proposed exception to that law would defeat a legiti-
mate interest of the forum state without serving a legitimate interest of
any other state. A court may find it difficult to ascertain whether a legiti-
mate interest exists in each state, but it is not thereby excused from
making inquiry. When it fails to do so, and assumes an interest without
demonstrating it, there is no clear basis for its decision. Thus in one case
a student at a Washington College was injured on a college-sponsored
tobogganing excursion in Idaho, allegedly through the negligence of the
college. Under Idaho law the college was immune from liability. Wash-
ington policy precluded immunity of charitable corporations for negli-
gence. Washington had enough contacts with the case to give it an inter-
est in the application of its policy. Even so, a United States District Court
in Washington, following Washington choice-of-law rules, granted sum-
mary judgment for the college under the law of Idaho because it hap-
pened to be the place of alleged injury.2 * It thus defeated a legitimate
interest of the forum state without inquiring into the interest of either
Washington or Idaho. The sole issue it decided was the capacity of the
college to be sued. It never reached the issue whether a tort had actually
been conmmitted, and the place of injury was therefore as irrelevant as it
was fortuitous, unless perchance Idaho had an interest in the issue of
2* Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash. 1955).
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capacity to be sued. It is bad enough for courts to prattle unintelligibly
about choice of law, but unforgivable when inquiry might have revealed
that there was no real conflict.
The reports abound with such confusion. Thus a Wisconsin court
frustrated its own state's policy, permitting spouses to sue each other for
negligence, with the usual ritual about place of wrong that led it to
choose the law of Illinois which had a contrary policy.30 Its preoccupa-
tion with place of wrong insulated it from any concern that it might be
giving Illinois law a wider application than Illinois itself had contem-
plated. It is hardly plausible that Illinois policy was ambitious enough to
envisage spouses wherever they might be domiciled. Lack of necessity is
the stepmother of invention, however, and the Wisconsin court cere-
brated to make a choice of law heedless of whether or not a conflict ex-
isted to compel it. The date of this case was 1931. Lest you write it off as
ancient history, it bears adding that it is still repeating itself.
As it was repeating itself in Connecticut in 1955," California closed
the book on it in a case on an Idaho accident involving California domi-
ciliaries." We had occasion to make a contemporary declaration of Cali-
fornia policy, namely, that tort actions are permissible between brothers
and sisters even though minors, and that minors may sue their parents
for wilful or malicious torts. We went on to hold that because of its sub.
stantial contacts with the case, the state had enough interest in the appli-
cation of its policy to invoke local law as the appropriate law. We held
that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family re-
lationship are properly determined by reference to the law of the state
of the family domicile and that hence no conflict was involved on the
issue of capacity to sue and be sued.
"That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulat-
ing the incidents of the family relationship and it is the only state in
which the parties can, by participation in the legislative processes, effect a
change in those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights,
duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by the family
relationship should constantly change as members of the family cross
state boundaries in temporary absences from their home."3 3
Other situations arise in which courts must be on the alert against
making exceptions to the local law that would defeat a legitimate interest
of the forum state without serving the interest of any other state. Though
soBuckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931); see Ford, Interspousal
Liability for Automobile Accidents In Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Prrr. L. REV. 397 (1954) .
a8 Bohenek v. Niedwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955).
s Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1956); see Ehrenzweig, Parental
Immunity In The Conflict of Laws, 23 U. Cmx. L. REv. 474 (1956).
33 Emery v. Emery, supra note 32, at 428, 289 P.2d at 223.
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they arise all over the country, I single out another California case3 ' only
because I remember it vividly as a striking illustration of the problem.
Two cars collided in Flagstaff, Arizona. All of the parties were resi-
dents of California. Plaintiffs, the driver of one car and his two pas-
sengers, sued the administrator of the estate of the driver of the other
car, who died of his injuries. California permits the survival of tort ac-
tions and Arizona does not.
California policy views damages for personal injuries as compensatory
and the survival statute implements that policy by subordinating the
interests of the decedent's heirs, legatees, devisees and creditors to the
interests of the injured person. California contacts were more than suf-
ficient to give the state an interest in applying its policy. Not only were
the parties residents of California but the decedent's estate was being
administered in California. The court parted company with the Restate-
ment by expressly rejecting the law of the place of wrong. It applied
California law and allowed recovery. Had it mechanically invoked the
law of the place of wrong, it would have made an exception to the local
law, defeating a legitimate interest of the forum state without serving the
interest of any other state. Even though Arizona had a policy giving pref-
erence over injured claimants to heirs, legatees, devises and creditors
of an estate, there was no indication that it had any contact with the case
other than the fortuitous occurrence of the accident in Arizona, hardly
sufficient to give it an interest in the application of its policy. Thus there
was no real conflict of laws in the case.35
So far we have seen how a court that assumes a conflict even though
none may actually exist can be misled into making an irrational excep-
tion to the local law. Such a court can also be misled into an irrational
insistence on local law. A California case 6 is again illustrative. Plaintiff,
a resident of California when the action was brought but not at the time
of injury, sought recovery from an Hawaiian resident whose child caused
his injury in Hawaii. Hawaiian law made resident parents liable for the
torts of their minor children. California law did not. California's policy
of immunizing parents hardly envisaged Hawaiian parents of children
who committed torts in Hawaii. In any event, the state had no contacts
with the case, apart from plaintiff's residence at the time of the action, to
give it an interest in applying its policy. Since Hawaii not only had a
n Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); see Currie, Survival of
Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in The Conflict of Laws, supra note 28.
" It may not be amiss to add that although the opinion in the case is my own, I do
not regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to be against the brooding back-
ground of a petrified forest. Yet I would make no more apology for it than that in reach-
ing a rational result it was less deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar
speech of choice of law.
36 Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323 (1927); see Paulsen & Sovern, Public
Policy In Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956) .
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well-defined policy but substantial contacts with the case, its law would
have qualified eminently as an exception to the local law. There was thus
no conflict. Nevertheless the court saw a ghost and flatly refused to take
jurisdiction "on account of the conflict of law which exists between the
forum and the foreign territory." It thus defeated a legitimate interest of
Hawaii without serving any interest of California. In the process it also
defeated the legitimate interest of its own resident in recovery.
If this California decision was not the best under the sun, neither was
it the worst. A Wisconsin court became so fascinated first by the ghost of
a conflict and then by the sanctity of its own policy that it chose is own
law even though there was not a single contact to give it an interest m
doing so.32 Plaintiff sought substantial damages from a New York tele-
graph company that delayed delivery of his message from New York to
Chicago. The telegraph blank limited liability to the price of the message,
a stipulation valid under the laws of both New York and Illinois. There
was no showing that either the sender or the addressee was a resident of
Wisconsin, that the message concerned anything in Wisconsin, or that
the message passed through Wisconsin. Nevertheless the court ignored
the law of the interested states and invoked its own, though it had no
legitimate interest in doing so. It had only a policy, valid for Wisconsin,
on which it stamped with evangelistic fervor: "This policy good indefi-
nitely for excursionists from other states. Any ghost accompanying them
will be wrapped up as a gift."
Not many courts have been quite so zealous to propagate local policy.
In the main, local judges as well as legislators make law with the local
scene only in mind, even when they use general terms. When a problem
arises with interstate repercussions, however, a court must determine
whether the policy underlying the statute or judicial precedent envisaged
more than local activities or persons. Difficulties arise when the policy is
local in one respect and not in the other.
A New Hampshire court encountered such a difficulty with a statute
providing that "No contract or conveyance by a married woman, as
surety or guarantor for her husband . . . shall be binding on her."38 It
held the statute inapplicable to a mortgage on New Hampshire land exe-
cuted by a married woman at her home in Massachusetts which had
abolished disabilities of married women. It found that the policy under-
lying the statute was to protect married women only in transactions tak-
ing place in New Hampshire. One might note parenthetically that when
the statute is thus localized to transactions in New Hampshire rather than
to the married women of New Hampshire, it narrows the protection or
3 Fox v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399 (1909); see Paulsen &
Sovern, supra note 36.
8 Proctor v. Frost, 89 N.H. 304, 197 Ad. 813 (1938).
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enlarges the freedom, depending on one's point of view, of New Hamp-
shire married women in transactions outside the state. At the same time
it broadens the protection, or narrows the freedom, of other married
women in transactions taking place in New Hampshire. The court's inter-
pretation generously upholds the security of transactions in other states.
The reverse of the coin is that it foists protection upon all married women
who come into New Hampshire even though they may have long since
ceased to be the victims of protection in their own states, which are most
concerned with their welfare. Whatever its imperfections, however, its
recognition of an exception to New Hampshire law was preferable to an
insistence upon New Hampshire law that would have served no interest
of New Hampshire. The real quarrel is less with the interpretation than
with the obsolescent statute itself. The wholesale liquidation of married
women's disabilities has fortunately put an end to the conflicts, real and
spurious, that they engendered.
Other areas remain, however, in which courts must recurringly deter-
mine the reach of a policy underlying local law. Again I cite a California
case without apology, because it is recent, because it held that at least one
California policy did not reach out to Texas, and because it bears the
intriguing title of People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria.39 The people, of
course, were Californians. The Victoria came out of Bexar County, Texas,
where Willie Smith bought it from a dealer. The dealer took a note and
chattel mortgage to secure the unpaid balance and promptly assigned it
to a Texas finance company. The mortgage specified that the car was not
to leave Bexar County without the written consent of the mortgagee.
Willie nevertheless took off with the car for California. Some time later
California seized it because he had used it in the state to transport nar-
cotics unlawfully. California statutes limit forfeiture consequent upon
such use to the interest of the purchaser if the innocent mortgagee proves
that before he took the mortgage he made a reasonable character investi-
gation of the purchaser. In Texas there was no forfeiture at all of auto-
mobiles used in the unlawful transportation of narcotics. There was
therefore no reason for the mortgagee to make a character investigation
and it did not do so.
The policy underlying the California requirement of a character inves-
tigation was to diminish the risk that automobiles would be sold to those
who might use them for unlawful transportation of narcotics. We found
that it applied only to California mortgagees. It was not reasonable to
suppose that California would expect an out-of-state mortgagee to inquire
into California law every time he took a mortgage. If one state could
reach out in such a manner, all states could, and there would be no end
3948 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957); cf. Chambers v. Consolidated Garage Co., 210
S.W. 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), af'd, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921).
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to the legal research incumbent upon a mortgagee. Given a policy in-
tended only for California mortgagees, even the substantial contacts of
California with the case did not give it an interest in the application of
that policy to an out-of-state mortgagee. There was thus no conflict be-
tween the restricted local policy and the Texas policy of protecting a
mortgagee's contractual rights. The parallel lines never met.
It is not always so clear, however, what the local policy is. Nor is it
always so clear that it is confined to local transactions or persons. Once
the court succeeds in ascertaining what the policy is, it may yet have to
determine whether or not it has more than a strictly local aspect. Such
statutes as the Workmen's Compensation Acts are exceptional in spelling
out their scope. Rarely does a statute or judicial opinion articulate whether
it can be extended to more than local transactions or persons.
If the local interest rests on a policy clearly envisaging more than local
transactions or persons, and that policy is expressed in a valid statute, it
is bound to prevail. If instead the policy is found in judicial precedent it
is not bound to prevail. If a court hitherto uncritical finds it backward in
comparison with that of the other state it may overrule its own precedent
as unsuitable not only for the instant case but for strictly local ones, and
in so doing again eliminate a conflict. It is as concerned in a conflict case
as in any other with optimum justice. It is alerted as in no other to alter-
natives that may reveal shortcomings in its own law, and its enlighten-
ment in such a case is bound to extend to purely local cases also.
There is little likelihood of many revelations so swift and devastating
as to counteract the gravitational pull on even the most open-minded
court toward the local policy. It may well find that the policy of the other
state is not enlightened and indeed so backward as to call for resistance.
Should it also find that the local policy has not yet been articulated in
statute or precedent, it may proceed to articulate it for the first time, for
purely local as well as interstate cases, and thereby create an open con-
flict with the other policy. Thus the court has a dual responsibility.
Within the confines of policy based on precedent, it can revise backward
local precedent to harmonize with an enlightened policy of another state.
It can also set an enlightened local precedent to conflict with the back-
ward policy of another state.
So far we have stated the problem narrowly in terms of one specific
policy against another. Conflict need not always be resolved in such
narrow terms. A perceptive court may dissipate conflict between specific
policies by training on what harmony there may be between large poli-
cies that govern them. We have examples for the asking on the local
scene. Thus we accept the large policy of putting an end to litigation by
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as governing any spe-
cific policy that may be frustrated by the termination of litigation. Pro-
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fessor Cheatham and Professor Reese40 have suggested a parallel in con-
flict of laws of a state's large policy of harmonious relations with other
states, which could appropriately govern lesser policies whenever it better
serves a long-range interest of the state besides fulfilling the reasonable
expectations of the parties. They approvingly cite Cammell v. Sewell,"
wherein an English court recognized a purchaser's title to shipwrecked
lumber acquired under Norwegian law at an auction sale held by the
master of the ship, even if under English law the master exceeded his
authority. A policy of harmonious relations with other nations dictated
the general rule that "if personal property is disposed of in a manner
binding according to the law of the country where it is, that disposition is
binding everywhere." In thus safeguarding title vested elsewhere against
the hazard of attack upon any change in location of the chattel, the court
subordinated immediate local considerations to facilitate commercial
intercourse that would in the long run better serve its interest.
More than one scholar has suggested that a state may also facilitate
commercial transactions having no significant public repercussions and
at the same time preclude conflict, by recognizing the autonomy of parties
of roughly equal bargaining power in a contract with multistate aspects.' 2
When more than one state has substantial contacts with the transaction,
it seems reasonable that equal parties should be free to designate the law
of one of the states as controlling the validity and effect of their contract,
since reasonable certainty is of the utmost importance to the parties and
needless uncertainty serves neither private nor state interests.
We have now run through a gamut of tests that dispel as spurious
many so-called conflicts. We have also considered various possibilities of
avoiding or diminishing actual conflict. We come at last to the conflict
pure and complicated, the conflict that cannot be routed, avoided or di-
minished, when the strong legitimate interest of one state squares away
for a head-on clash with the strong legitimate interest of another. How-
ever the forum court now avoids collision, it must do so at a price to its
own state or another. Should it yield to the interest of the other state, it
would sacrifice the interest of its own. The likelihood is that, freed of
metaphysical rules of choice of law, the forum court will let the local
interest prevail and sacrifice the interest of the other state. Professor
Currie has marshalled formidable arguments for the proposition that this
is as it should be.43 As such scholars continue their constructive analysis
of the cases, there may be in time only vestigial reminders of the dismal
so Choice 01 The Applicable Law, 52 CoLUM. L. REV. 959 (1952) .
41 5 H & N 728, 157 Eng. Rep. 1371 (Exch. 1860); cf. Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz.
408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928).
42 See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts In The Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. Rav.
1072 (1953).
*a Articles cited note 28 supra.
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era when courts invoked mechanical rules without regard for legitimate
state interests.
There will remain the inevitable problem in a federal system that re-
curringly competing state interests in a conflicts case may have to be
evaluated in the light of the national interest in interstate harmony. It is
the classic political problem of weighing, adjusting, and harmonizing
diverse community values, which is ultimately the responsibility of Con-
gress. No wonder the Supreme Court is now disentangling itself there-
from after some unhappy efforts to elevate choice-of-law rules to consti-
tutional rank." It does not follow, however, that Congress either would
or should enact choice-of-law rules posthaste, or even that it should ever
enact them wholesale. As we now finish one long servitude to categorical
imperatives, we should be on guard against another. The law of conflicts
has been kept in its infancy all too long to survive another deep freeze.
It has a chance at last to develop freely. Only as progressive case law
accumulates can we gain the necessary perspective for determining the
areas in which conflicting state interests so chronically threaten interstate
harmony as to call for federal legislation.
For some time to come, therefore, the main responsibility for the ra-
tional development of conflict of laws is bound to remain with the state
courts. The responsible court will have to be on its mettle. It must be
prepared to reject unrealistic rules, yet cautious enough not to make for-
mulations that reach too zealously into the future or give too zealous a
scope to local policy. It must distinguish between real and spurious con-
flicts at the outset. It must temper its freedom to declare local policy and
its scope with a sense for harmonious interstate relations as well as for
the justifiable expectations of the parties.
There are always some to remind us that those who make decisions on
our courts, like those who make decisions elsewhere, may sometimes be
provincial in outlook. They say no more than that there is always a short-
age of wise men. It is answer enough to the misanthropes that the forces
against provincialism are strong today and that a judge trained to look
through the partisan wrappings of a conflict will be inclined to look
through provincial wrappings as well. There is no reason why he should
be less dispassionate in a conflicts case than in any other. The hazard is
less of impassioned provincialism than of the lingering ills of a passive
formalism.
" See Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VMD. L. REV. 581 (1963);
Gurrie, The Constitution And The Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and The
Judicial Function, supra note 28.
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